This paper focuses on the problem of information transmission between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with communication modeled as cheap talk. I posit that the Fund and the Bank have strategically relevant and diverse expertise whose proper combination might provide a richer consideration and resolution of strategic issues. Although transparent sharing of all available information is in the best interest of Fund's and Bank's shareholders, competitive pressures might hinder such process, introducing biases in the two institutions' preferences. However, concerns for conformity, due to external political pressures, might mitigate such e¤ect. By comparing model's results to the …rst best outcome I show that the expected loss is made up of two components: a "own preference con…rmation" loss, and a "strategic communication" loss. When concerns for conformity are very relevant, strategic communication becomes the primary source of loss.
Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF/Fund) and the World Bank (WB/Bank) were originally set up as two distinct and independent institutions with complementary tasks and di¤erent methods of intervention, within the framework of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944) . Over the years, however, their mandates have expanded in response to the changing realities of the global economy and the degree of overlap between the two has increased, leading to more room for both con ‡ict and cooperation.
The importance of close collaboration between the Bank and the Fund is a well recognized fact, which has also been periodically emphasized in a number of o¢ cial documents. Krueger (1997) for example stresses that the functions of lending policy, advice, training, research and provision of information of both the Bank and the Fund are mutually complementary and that the spillover from each of the functions to the others are large. Indeed, macroeconomic and monetary stability (a major Fund concern) have a direct bearing on supply side measures and development prospects (a Bank responsibility). This implies, as the Malan Report (2007,p. 18) argues, that "..for each institutions to e¤ectively ful…ll all its responsibilities, it must depend on the other, ...it means there must be trust that the other its doing its job because they have to rely on each other.". 1 In other words, the Fund and the Bank should not consider themselves as independent players, since in many situations the actions of one player do a¤ect the outcome of the other player's actions.
However, despite a series of declarations and agreements aimed at strengthening BankFund collaboration, it is widely believed that coordination still falls short of what could be rationally expected (Truman, 2006) . The costs to recipient countries of insu¢ cient cooperation between the Fund and the Bank are signi…cant: studies have shown that uncoordinated activities can lead to con ‡icting advice and/or to place unnecessary demands on country's of…cials, and sometimes to duplication of conditionality (Lombardi and Momani, 2010) . Having two self-interested sta¤, each giving con ‡icting advices, puts a strain on borrower countries and ultimately a¤ects policy and program outcomes (Feinberg, 1988; Easterly, 2002; Dreher, 2009 ). The o¢ cial reports, that have tried to identify guidelines aimed at enhancing cooperation between the Bank and the Fund, have almost unanimously agreed that "information sharing" is the area which needs to be greatly improved. This comes as no surprise since successful cooperation does require e¤ective transmission of information whenever informational asymmetries exist. 2 In this regard Levin, Cross, and Abrams (2004), for example, a¢ rm that one way to measure inter-organizational trust or cooperation is to determine whether 1 The Malan Report is a report prepared by an independent high-level committee chaired by Pedro Malan, Chairman of the Board of Unibanco and a former Minister of Finance of Brazil, to examine cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank. 2 Although the extent of overlap between the operations of the two organizations have increased over time, they still maintain a strongly specialized expertise in their core areas of intervention: monetary, …scal, and exchange rate policies for the Fund and policy areas related to development for the Bank. Therefore, each institution collects specialized information that is only partially overlapping with what collected by the other.
knowledge is shared. More precisely, if two organizations share competence based trust, i.e. each believes that the counterpart is su¢ ciently knowledgeable of the topics, particularly when they are complex, knowledge sharing is expected to exist. Thus This paper contributes to …ll this gap. I focus on the problem of information transmission between these two institutions, with communication modeled as cheap talk. 3 This choice is justi…ed by the fact that, as the reform agenda has deepened to include institutional and social reforms, the collection of specialized information by the Fund and the Bank has increasingly consisted in acquiring country-speci…c inputs (or local knowledge), which are mainly made up of unveri…able information (soft information). 4 In this context, the existence of incentives con ‡icts between the Bank and the Fund might hinder credible information transmission, as shown in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) seminal paper on strategic information transmission.
In this paper I posit that the Fund and the Bank have strategically relevant and diverse expertise whose proper combination might provide to both institutions a richer consideration and resolution of strategic issues. Although confrontation and transparent sharing of all available information is in the best interest of Fund's and Bank's shareholders (i.e. global taxpayers), competitive pressures might hinder such process, introducing biases in the two institutions'preferences. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that "turf wars", due to "domain dissent", are frequent between the Fund and the Bank. 5 The existence of competitive goals due to the desire to take the lead on some political issue and/or the desire to di¤erentiate and prove competence, might thus distort decision-making (relative to the …rst best). Speci…cally, competitive pressure might skew Fund and Bank decisions in the direction of their initial preferred alternative, exclusively based on their own private information, although such decisions might not be optimal from their shareholders' perspective. Competitive pressures might thus introduce a "own preference con…rmation" bias in the Fund and the Bank preferences. 6 However, pressures for coordination, coming from large creditors and/or …nancial sector or from powerful borrower governments, might introduce concerns for conformity in each institution's objective function, which mitigate the negative e¤ects of competition.
This paper develops a model that incorporates in a stylized way the key features described above. Namely, each institution's decision process takes place in two stages: cheap talk communication and decision-making. In the communication stage the two institutions transmit their private information strategically to in ‡uence decision making to their advantage; in the decision making stage each institution tries to balance the bene…t of setting its policy decision close to its preferred (biased) alternative, with the bene…t of setting its decision close to the other institution's expected decision.
By comparing results to the …rst best outcome, which is characterized by the Fund and the Bank sharing the same preferences (absence of con ‡ict), we show that the expected loss is made up of two components: a "own preference con…rmation" loss, and a "strategic communication" loss. The …rst component gives the expected loss under perfect information. It only depends on the preferences'bias, which impairs the ability of each organization to take decisions fully adapted to the "true" state of the world. This ine¢ ciency cancels out as the need to coordinate actions becomes the main concern of the two institutions. The second component is due to the cost of strategic uncertainty that each institution faces over each other's decision after communication. Strategic uncertainty leads to coordination failures over and above any inherent biases in the equilibrium decisions. When concerns for conformity are very relevant, strategic communication becomes the primary source of loss relative to the …rst best outcome. Indeed, although the two institutions agree on the need to coordinate their actions, in an imperfect information context (with misaligned interests), communication is always distorted, since both actors will try, by manipulating information, to induce the counterpart to make an adjustment closer to their own (suboptimal) preferences.
Two factors determine the relevance of such loss: the level of competition between the two institutions, which in turn determines the size of the preferences'bias, and the relevance of their specialized local information (unshared information) relative to shared information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y presents the related literature. Section 3 o¤ers some institutional information and stylized facts regarding the "con ‡icting" relationship between the Fund and the Bank. Section 4 describes the model set up. Section 5 characterizes decision making. Section 6 discusses the main features of strategic communication. Section 7 analyses the performance of the two institutions relative to the …rst best.
Section 8 discusses the normative implications of the model, and …nally Section 9 concludes.
Related literature
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the role of international …nancial organizations (IFOs), in promoting …nancial stability and development. My contribution concentrates on the problem of information transmission between the two institutions. As such it reconnects with the arguments developed in Marchesi, Sabani and Dreher (2011) and at the same time relates to di¤erent strands of the economic literature which focus on communication and decision making in organizations. Speci…cally, a similar model set-up is used by Malenko (2014) to analyze communication and decision-making in corporate boards, where each board member has private information relevant to the board's collective decision, and she studies how diversity in member's preferences and concerns for conformity a¤ect communication. 7 See for example Khan and Sharma (2001) , Drazen (2001) , Ivanova (2006) , Marchesi and Sabani (2007) . Di¤erently Mayer and Mormouras (2005) examine the impact of IMF-supported reform programs on domestic politics using the theory of special interest politics. The World Bank and the IMF were set up as two distinct and independent institutions with di¤erent tasks and methods of intervention as part of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944). While the Fund was responsible for establishing short-run macroeconomic stability, the Bank was supposed to develop long-run development programs. Despite being separate institutions, it was immediately recognized that there were broad areas of common interest, that required close cooperation. However, relations between the two institutions have not always been "close", and they have frequently seemed to operate independently rather than in a cooperative manner (Gold, 1982) . The di¢ culty of coordinating actions is also re ‡ected in the large number of memoranda, statements, guidelines and reviews regarding the issue of The acknowledgement of the existence of structural links between the Fund and the Bank became increasingly important during the 1970s and the 1980s, when the IMF decided that demand management policies needed to be supplemented by supply side policies. Simultaneously, the Bank altered its stance and gave more explicit recognition of the importance of macropolicies besides its traditional role and sector lending. Moreover, during the 1980s, the Fund's lending became more concessional and related to structural matters, and increasingly focused on lower income countries which became the main recipients of the Bank's "services".
Besides, the 1980s debt crisis called for more closely coordinated e¤orts to assist indebted countries. 10 It became clearer that the structural links between the two institutions'operations made it impossible for them to act as independent players. For example, the public expenditure policy proposed by the Bank would not have been consistent with the Fund's targets in terms of macroeconomic stability; credit restraints to restore …nancial stability, required by the Fund, would have clashed with the need to …nance supply side measures promoted by the Bank; the exchange rate regime proposed by the Fund would have not been consistent with the export support measures proposed by the Bank. As well as these direct links, indirect …nancial links also needed to be considered. In particular, the withholding of credit by either of the two institutions might have had a negative e¤ect on the other's program, through third-party …nancial links (Feinberg, 1988 ). 9 It is important to underline that de facto both institutions provide budget and balance of payment support. Indeed, …scal and external …nancing needs are often closely intertwined and …nancial support from each institution provides foreign exchange and helps to loosen …scal constraints. (IMF, 2010). 10 Between 1980 and 1984 energy prices were addressed in 46% of Fund supported programs, the mobilization of domestic savings in 54% investment planning and execution in 37%. These were areas of primary responsibility of the Bank. Similarly the Bank was increasingly concerned with many variables central to Fund stabilization program (Feinberg, 1988) . 11 If the Fund had judged the borrower to be in non compliance, the commercial banks involved in the country may have halted disbursments as well. The loss of commercial bankscredits could thus have undermined the borrower's creditworthiness, destroying the ability to proceed with Bank -supported structural Coordination was therefore crucial, but as Boughton (2001) However, later on, in 1998, during the Asian crisis, a further disagreement led to a joint statement issued by the Bank president and the Fund managing director on Bank-Fund collaboration (e.g., see Mallaby, 2004) in which the leaders of the two organizations restated the need for improved collaboration. As stressed by the Malan Report (2007), the lack of a cooperative culture has caused the two institutions to operate as if they had competitive rather than cooperative goals The debate over "…scal space" highlights this problem. The Bank sta¤ who were interviewed by the Malan commission accused the Fund of focusing exclusively on short-term macroeconomic stability, jeopardizing both growth-enhancing investment and poverty reduction spending (a Bank responsibility). On the other hand, Fund sta¤ accused the Bank of "mission creep", given its excessive involvement in …scal space estimates, often leading to the conclusion that there was much more room for public spending than had been indicated by the Fund. According to the Malan Report, the tensions between the two institutions over the issue of "…scal space" depended on the fact that macroeconomic stability and longer term growth were erroneously viewed by the two institutions as competitive goals rather than complementary goals. On the contrary, a properly designed …scal policy should combine the Bank's and Fund's di¤erent expertise since".. macroeconomic stability will not reforms or investment projects.Similarly, a negative Bank …nding could have disrupted commercial bank credit and adversely a¤ected the borrower's budgetary revenues, credit policies, exchange reserves, causing it to fail to meet Fund program targets. (Feinberg, 1988) be sustained unless it is linked and accompanied by supply side measures that enhance long term growth and development" (Malan Report, 2007 p. 32) . The Fund work on aggregates should therefore rely on the Bank's analysis of the e¤ectiveness of public spending programs and public spending priorities needed to achieve growth. This also implies that the exchange of country-speci…c information becomes of crucial importance, and it is hardly surprising that both the Bank sta¤ and the Fund sta¤ expressed concerns precisely over this point.
Cooperation between the Fund and the Bank seems to work better when it is mandatory. 
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It is common knowledge that x F and x B are uniformly distributed on _ x i ; x i ; with i = F; B, and the draws of x F and x B are independent. 13 Formally, the variance of x F (i.e., 
Preferences
In theory the Fund and the Bank are responsible for di¤erent areas of conditionality but in practice, as we have seen in sect 2, their responsibilities have become more and more di¢ cult to distinguish. In these situations the Fund and the Bank often engage in disputes which are mainly motivated by competition on the leading role. Woods (2006, p.6) calls this con ‡ict "..a turf war that results when each institution vies for the lead role in promulgating a particular economic reform". In other words, the confrontation is often about which institution should take the lead on which issue. In this regard, Fabricius (2007) , referring to case studies, stresses that in each of the policy areas where domain dissent was actually observed, the Bank and the Fund carried out de facto independent assessments and came to independent conclusions about the stance to be taken vis-à-vis the borrowing government. 
Preferences with domain consensus
For domain consensus I mean a situation in which the two organizations agree that a correct evaluation of country's "fundamentals" requires a joint analysis of the recipient country, with each institution guiding the other in its core areas of expertise. The joint analysis thus leads to a common evaluation of the state of the world given by (1) .
In this scenario I assume that the Fund and the Bank have to minimize respectively the following quadratic loss functions
The …rst term of the loss functions represents the loss due to a not satisfactory adaptation to the state of the world given by (1) . The second component re ‡ects the Fund's or the Bank's concern for conformity: that is, I assume that each organization su¤ers a loss if its action deviates from the action of the other. Concerns for conformity might capture the reluctance to deviate from the other institution's decision due to strong pressures for coordination coming from large creditors and/or …nancial sector or from powerful borrower governments. 15 The parameter 2 [0; 1) measures the relative weight of coordination losses 14 Fabricious (2007) reports several episodes where strong turf sensitivity and resulting protectionist stance was found to lead to domain dissent. The author also stresses that this turf sensitivity occurred exclusively among individuals in the Fund and never on the part of the Bank . The IMF (1998) external evaluation report con…rms that "Fund sta¤ are often cast in an in ‡exible mold by their brie…ng papers and mandates, and are much to quick to plead jurisdiction and turf when di¤erences arise" (IMF 1998, p. 58). 15 Concerns for conformity might also capture the presence of strategic complementariness of the Fund and the Bank actions For example, Bank supported structural reforms or investment projects could not be feasible, if credit restraints decided by the Fund undermine borrower's credit worthiness; similarly, a negative Bank assessment of the country could disrupt commercial bank credit, and adversely a¤ect the relative to adaptation losses.
Preferences with domain dissent
Focusing on situations where domain dissent prevails, I assume that the presence of competitive pressures causes both organizations to have biased views of the state of the world. Namely, in evaluating fundamentals both institutions give more weight to their own private information (signal) relative to a situation characterized by the absence of competitive pressures. In turn, this implies that the Fund and the Bank would have di¤erent and suboptimal (biased) views of the state of the world, that is respectively
for the Fund and
for the Bank, where F > > B : Loss functions can therefore be rewritten as:
This assumption on preferences is justi…ed by results of a great deal of experimental literature on team groups. Such contributions have shown that competitive pressures cause people who work in teams to be reluctant to accept others' perspectives, leading to bi- The negative e¤ects of competitive pressures are partially amended by the second term of the loss functions (6) and (7), which represents concern for conformity. For high values of ; "turf" sensitivity would matter less and sta¤ of the two organizations would be forced to put aside their own preferences to achieve conformity of actions. recipient country's ability to meet Fund …nancial assistance expected targets; the exchange rate regime proposed by the Fund could prevent export support measures proposed by the Bank from achieving their desired outcomes etc.. 5 Decision making
Time line

Domain consensus
In case of domain consensus the Fund and the Bank take their decisions to minimize the expected value of (2) and (3) respectively, given the observed signals and the communicated information.
with i = F; B and j = F; B Taking the …rst order conditions and solving the reaction functions for the equilibrium actions, yields
Domain dissent
Now I focus on the case in which there is domain dissent. In this situation there is a con ‡ict on the evaluation of the state of the world, with both organization giving more weight to their private information relatively to (1) . I focus on the extreme scenario in which both organizations give zero weight to the other organization's information in evaluating the state of the world. This is consistent with what observed by Fabricious (2007) that, in case of domain dissent, the Fund and the Bank appeared to carry out independent evaluations of the state of the world. This means that (6) and (7) reduce to
These preferences' structure permits to refer to the theoretical framework developed by ADM to study coordination in organizations with multiple divisions and distributed information. At the decision-making stage, institution i with i = F; B solves,
Taking the …rst order conditions, and solving the reaction functions for the equilibrium decisions yields
and
where
The Fund decision is a convex combination of its signal x F , its posterior beliefs about x B (i.e., E(x B j x F ; m B )); and the Bank posterior belief about x F (i.e., E(x F j x B ; m F )). Similarly, the Bank decision is a convex combination of its signal x B , its posterior beliefs about x F ;
(i.e., E(x F j x B ; m F )); and the Fund posterior belief about x B ; (i.e., E(x B j x F ; m B )). 16 
Communication
Before starting the analysis of the incentives to mirepresent information (strategic communication), it is important to underline that in case of domain consensus, i.e. in absence of con ‡icting goals, it is rational to communicate truthfully private information, that is m F = x F and m B = x B . This result can be easily derived from (8) and (9) The analysis follows ADM, so I refer to their contribution for technical details. 16 As ! 1; for given posterior beliefs, both decisions converge to the same value, that is d
; the need to balance con ‡icting preferences and coordination disappears and both institutions only put weight on the adaptation to their respective signal draw. This implies that d F = x F and d B = x B .
Incentives to misrepresent information
The Malan Report (2007) 
Communication equilibria.
In the context of this communication game, ADM show that all communication equilibria are interval equilibria in which the state space, [ x i ; x i ], i = F; B, is partitioned into intervals, and agent i chooses a random message from the subinterval to which the true value x i belongs. 19 The message, therefore, reveals to the other agent only the range in which the true observation lies and the quality of communication is indeed represented by the interval length: the coarser the partition, the nosier communication. It follows that the receiver's posterior on x i , given the message m i , is uniform on the interval that contains m i (i.e., E(x i j x j ; m i ) is the midpoint of the interval that contains m i ). 17 On this point see the Malan Report (2007) and the Joint Management Action Plan on Bank-Fund Collaboration (JMAP) Report (2010). The Malan Report indicates a number of speci…c issues where collaboration needs to be strenghtened. Among them it is stressed for example that the Fund is not readily sharing …nancial programming data with the Bank; Bank works on public expenditure without informing Fund programs and surveillance in a systematic way; the Fund's Government Finance Statistics does not provide adequate breakdown of expenditure to be used by the Bank. 18 It is straightforward to show that only when x F = 0 communication will be truthful. 19 The solution concept employed is Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium,which is simply a Nash equilibrium in which each agent responds optimally to his opponent's strategy choice, taking into account his probabilistic beliefs, and minimizing expected loss over his possible strategy choices. Let denote by t 2N i i = (t i ; N i ; :t i; j ::t i; 1 ; t i;0 ; t i;1 ; :t i;j ::t i;N i ) the partitioning of [ x i ; x i ], into 2N i intervals, for i = F; B and j = ( N i ::::0; 1:::N i ): ADM show that in equilibrium the size of the generic interval (t i;j+1 t i;j ) is equal to the size of the preceding interval (t i;j t i;j 1 ) plus 4 1+ t i;j ; symmetrically, the size of the interval (t i; (j+1 ) t i; j ) is equal to that of the preceding interval plus 4 1+ t i; j : This implies that the quality of communication deteriorates as x i moves further away from its mean value, that is x i = 0. Therefore, the less information is communicated by each institution to the other, the larger the observed value of the signal is. This result is intuitive since the incentives to misrepresent information increase with the module of x i . Furthermore, we can see that the length of the intervals decreases with : Consistently with intuition, this means that communication becomes more precise as the need for coordination increases. ADM demonstrate that as the number of partitions 2N i goes to in…nity, the most e¢ cient Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is achieved.
In such an equilibrium the size of the intervals is in…nitesimally small for x i close to 0 and increases at a growing rate as the module of the observed x i increases. In what follows, I
refer to this equilibrium, which represents the focal point of the communication game.
6.3 Information loss due to strategic communication. ) is equal to zero (no information is transmitted). Therefore, I de…ne as residual variance (or RV ), the variance that institution i ex ante expects to face after receiving the message by the other institution. Formally
The residual variance gives a measure of the information loss due to strategic communication.
The coarser the space partition, the lower the value of E x i ( m i 2 ); and in turn the greater the information loss. In the focal equilibrium, ADM show that
It is straightforward to verify that S tends to 1 4 (upper bound) as goes to 0. This means that as concern for conformity tends to zero, agents reveal each other only the sign of the observed signal (that is the partition contains just two intervals). Conversely, the quality of communication improves as increases, although it always remains bounded away from perfect information. Indeed, it can be shown that S tends to 1 7 (lower bound) as goes to in…nity. Intuitively, although the two institutions agree on the need to better coordinate their actions, in a imperfect information context with misaligned interests, each of them will distort the transmitted information in order to convince the other to make an adjustment that suits better its own preferences. In this way much valuable information is lost.
Social expected loss
Having derived the decisions and the quality of communication in equilibrium, I can solve for the social expected loss.
If the state of the world is given by (1), Fund and Bank shareholders'loss would depend on the distance of the Fund and the Bank actions d F and d B from :Thus, I de…ne the social expected loss as
In case of domain consensus ( no con ‡icting preferences) the social expected loss is equal to zero since d F = d B = : In other words full alignment of interests and truthful communication allow the pooling of the two complementary pieces of unshared information, leading to actions fully adapted to the state of the world. I refer to this case as the First
Best. In case of domain dissent (con ‡icting preferences), by substituting (12) and (13) in (18) and by taking the expected value, yields
)) (19) 20 In taking the expected value I make use of the following equalities
All equalities follow from independence of x F and x B and from the fact that in equilibrium
and where a and b are given by (14) . :
, with i = F; B . Substituting in (19) , yields
Remembering that S measures the information loss due to strategic communication, I
can rewrite the social expected loss as being made by two components: EL P I and EL C . The …rst component is obtained by putting S = 0 in (20) and shows the social expected loss under perfect information, that is
EL P I captures the loss solely due to the "turf battle", which leads the two organizations to choose actions "too distant" from the "true" state of the world, since too much biased towards their own initial preference (i.e. their observed signal x i , i = F; B), even in a context of perfect symmetric information.
The second component is the loss resulting from strategic uncertainty, that is
EL C captures the fact that domain dissent causes communication to be distorted. Indeed, both organizations try, by manipulating information, to induce the counterpart to make an adjustment closer to their own signal. In this attempt much socially valuable information is lost.
In the following, I investigate how concerns for conformity a¤ect the two components of the social expected loss. For analytical tractability, I assume
As for the …rst component of the social expected loss, I prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In case of perfect information, as concerns for conformity increase, the quality of decisions gradually improves. Nonetheless, as goes to in…nity, decisions will never converge to the …rst best, unless = 1 2
. Conversely, the expected loss is at its maximum when = 0:
Proof. See Appendix
Consistently with intuition, in a perfect information context, the ine¢ ciency, which is due to each organization "own preference con…rmation" bias, decreases as pressures for coordination increase (i.e. increases) .Namely, as ! 1 decisions converge to
.-Therefore, external pressures for coordination lead to consistency, although decisions will never converge to the …rst best, (i.
. Put another way, concerns for conformity may force the two organizations to speak with one voice, but they do not fully substitute for the cooperative behaviour observable in case of domain consensus. Nonetheless, current forms of collaboration, that strive for consistency, may actually improve the Bank's and the Fund's performance. 21 As for the strategic communication component, I prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The expected loss due to strategic communication is zero for = 0: As increases the quality of information increases as well as the value agents give to information.
Overall the expected loss rises and as ! 1 converging to . 
Proof. See Appendix
When the two organizations do not give importance to coordinate actions (( = 0), counterpart's information and therefore communication has not value. In other words, decisions do not depend from transmitted information. This implies that the strategic communication loss is equal to zero (while EL P I is at its maximum). As concerns for conformity increase, communication becomes more valuable and the expected loss due to strategic uncertainty starts rising. However, as the need of coordination keeps on rising, both the Fund and the Bank improve communication quality although truthful communication will never be achieved: namely, EL C remains bounded away from zero as tends to in…nity. Finally, from the above propositions the following Lemma can be proved.
Lemma 1 Given ;the expected social loss is a decreasing function of :
Proof. See Appendix 21 For a di¤erent view see Fabricius (2007) and Hagen (2013) To sum up, if the two institutions perceive (or they are forced to perceive) a great mutual dependency, they try to coordinate their actions in order to minimize expected losses. This amends the misalignments of interests due to the "turf battle", and, as goes to in…nity, brings to …rst best decisions in case of perfect information and = 1 2
. Conversely, in case of imperfect information, the expected social loss always remains bounded away from zero, because of the loss due to strategic uncertainty: Indeed, although the two institutions agree on the need of better coordinating their actions, in an imperfect information context, communication is always distorted, since both actors will try, by manipulating information, to induce the counterpart to make an adjustment closer to their own preferences. Nonethlessl, pressures for coordination always improve the two organizations'expected performance.
Normative and testable implications
The model does provide some normative implications on how to ameliorate cooperation between IMF and WB. Fabricius (2007) and the Malan report (2007) stress that to remove "turf war" con ‡icts that jeopardize collaboration, the two organizations should move towards a stronger division of labor. Although this is not an easy task, attempts should certainly be made to more clearly focus the activities and the responsibilities of each institution. To this end, each organization's comparative advantage should be without equivocation restated in each speci…c conditional lending context. Indeed, the explicit introduction of the "lead agency"
concept for dealing with speci…c policy issues could help to ensure clarity of roles, improve accountability, and increase transparency. However, since the Bank and the Fund activities are often inherently linked, it should be stressed that in many cases it would not be possible to cordon o¤ areas of exclusive responsibilities and in this context "assigning experts"
might not bring about the desired positive e¤ects, unless the two institutions ultimate goals were explicitly motivated by cooperation. 22 Indeed, experimental research on hidden pro…les has revealed that when group members are motivated by self-interest, the positive e¤ects of identifying clear comparative advantages (i.e. "assigning experts") may be questioned or even reversed (Toma et al 2013) . Thus, it is not surprising that the various arrangements to promote a division of labor between the Bank and the Fund have fallen short of ensuring consistency. A stronger division of labor should come along with the introduction of contract provisions directed to ameliorate incentive alignments between the two organiza- 22 "Relying on formal divisions of labor..is .. problematic because of the interdependence between di¤erent policy variables. Generally, such a division makes the Fund responsible for the aggregate management of the economy and the Bank responsible for individual sectors. Such a distinction is highly arti…cial calling into question the viability of any division of labor." Fabricius (2007) p. 41. tions. Speci…cally, in order to decrease the self-interest, it is essential that sta¤ incentives be appropriately aligned with institutional commitments to improve Bank-Fund collaboration. 23 Requirements to hold compulsory regular joint consultations for country teams go in this direction, since they could help building trust relationships, which are fundamental to overcome competitive pressures. 24 Introducing new programs were collaboration is mandatory, The theoretical analysis gives also some hints for testable implications. According to the model the overall performance of the two institutions is mainly jeopardised by competition, which is responsible for preferences' bias and ultimately for strategic communication. I expect therefore to …nd a relationship between variables used as proxies for the degree of asymmetric information and/or the degree of competition between the two institutions, and an opportunely chosen measure of their performance. 25 .
Conclusions
Despite a series of o¢ cial agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, it is widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls short of what should be rationally expected. In this paper I present a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality of information transmission between the IMF and the WB, analyses the sources of the expected loss in the overall performance of the two institutions relative to the …rst best outcome. The latter is de…ned as a situation where each institution recognizes the other institution's information and competence as complementary to its own, and they 23 For example, the ability to work in team with the other organization's sta¤ members could become a criterion to employ new people for both institutions. In this direction goes also the proposal to introduce a recognition award for sta¤ that demonstrate a particularly strong commitment to working constructively with their Bretton Woods counterparts. 24 It is important to note that the requirement of holding regular joint consultation between country teams was a key component of the Joint Management Action Plan (JMAP) and was introduced in 2008. However, results have not been fully satisfactory. By december 2009 only 44% of country teams had met the requirement. (IMF, 2010) . 25 For a …rst attempt is this direction see Marchesi and Sabani (2013) both agree that a correct evaluation of country's "fundamentals" requires a joint analysis of the recipient country, with each institution guiding the other in its core areas of expertise (domain consensus). On the contrary we have domain dissent when the Fund and the Bank engage in disputes motivated by competition on the leading role, with the two institutions carrying out de facto independent assessments of country's fundamentals, not recognizing the relevance of the other institution's information and competence.
In this paper each institution's decision process takes place in two stages: cheap talk communication and decision-making In case of domain dissent, each institution tries to balance the bene…t of setting its policy decision close to its preferred (biased) alternative, with the bene…t of setting its decision close to the other institution's expected decision.
As a consequence, in the communication stage the two institutions transmit their private information strategically in order to induce the counterpart to make an adjustment closer to their own (suboptimal) preferences.
By comparing our results to the …rst best outcome, we show that the expected loss is made up of two components: a "own preference con…rmation" loss, and a "strategic communication" loss. The …rst component gives the expected loss under perfect information. It only depends on the fact that in case of domain dissent each institution overlooks the counterpart information in evaluating the state of the world. The "own preference con…rmation" bias impairs the ability of each organization to take decisions fully adapted to the "true" state of the world. This ine¢ ciency cancels out as the need to coordinate actions becomes the main concern of the two institutions. The second component is due to the cost of strategic uncertainty that each institution faces over each other's decision after communication, leading to coordination failures over and above any inherent biases in the equilibrium decisions. When concerns for conformity are very relevant, strategic communication becomes the primary source of loss relative to the …rst best outcome. Two factors play an important role in determining the relevance of such loss: the level of competition between the two institutions, which determines the size of the preference's bias, and the relevance of their specialized local information (unshared information) relative to shared information. This paper contains a number of policy implications. Firstly, identifying in strategic uncertainty an important source of loss relative to the …rst best, it provides a rational foundation to a large number of o¢ cial reports calling for more information sharing between the two institutions. The introduction of clear guidelines on information sharing between Bank and Fund sta¤ would ameliorate (although not eliminate) the existing distortions in communication. Secondly, paper's results suggest that a stronger division of labor could help to mitigate "turf war" problems, but the clear identi…cation of each institution's comparative advantage, for each speci…c policy issue, should come along the introduction of contract provisions directed to ameliorate incentive alignments between the two organizations. Indeed, experimental literature on hidden pro…les has shown that "assigning experts" produces the desired positive e¤ects, in terms of enhancing unshared information pooling, only when experts are motivated by cooperation and not by self-interest. that is greater than zero for any ; and reach its minimum for = and reaches its maximum for = 0 and = 1:
Finally it is possible to show that Furthermore it is possible to verify that The …rst term in square brackets on the right hand side is clearly decreasing with ; since a is decreasing with . As for the second term , that is negative, it is increasing in absolute value with :
